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When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?

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2023

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Kasberger, Bernhard

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International Journal of Industrial Organization. Elsevier. 2023, 89, 102972. ISSN 0167-7187. eISSN 1873-7986. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972

Zusammenfassung

I study auctions in which firms bid for licenses that reduce their marginal costs in a post-auction downstream market. When there are three or more firms, I show that the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction maximizes consumer surplus in dominant strategies if and only if it maximizes producer surplus in dominant strategies. With two firms, the effect on consumer surplus is ambiguous. When the VCG auction does not maximize consumer surplus, I show that consumer surplus can be maximized by adding caps, i.e., restricting the number of licenses a bidder can win. This might lower producer surplus.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

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Strategy and Management, Industrial relations, Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous), Economics and Econometrics

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ISO 690KASBERGER, Bernhard, 2023. When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?. In: International Journal of Industrial Organization. Elsevier. 2023, 89, 102972. ISSN 0167-7187. eISSN 1873-7986. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972
BibTex
@article{Kasberger2023-07aucti-67985,
  year={2023},
  doi={10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972},
  title={When can auctions maximize post-auction welfare?},
  volume={89},
  issn={0167-7187},
  journal={International Journal of Industrial Organization},
  author={Kasberger, Bernhard},
  note={Article Number: 102972}
}
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