Publikation:

Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?

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Kaas_284982.pdf
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Datum

2004

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Schriftenreihe

European Central Bank Working Paper Series;403 / November 2004

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-284982
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Urheberrechtlich geschützt

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Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green

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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Published

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Zusammenfassung

The paper analyzes how the removal of barriers to entry in banking affect loan competition, bank stability and economic welfare. We consider a model of spatial loan competition where a market that is served by less efficient banks is opened to entry by banks that are more efficient in screening borrowers. It is shown that there is typically too little entry and that market shares of entrant banks are too small relative to their socially optimal level. This is because efficient banks internalize only the private but not the public benefits of their better credit assessments. Only when bank failure is very likely or very costly, socially harmful entry can occur.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Entry deregulation, Bank competition

Konferenz

Rezension
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ISO 690KAAS, Leo, 2004. Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?
BibTex
@techreport{Kaas2004Finan-28498,
  year={2004},
  series={European Central Bank Working Paper Series;403 / November 2004},
  title={Financial market integration and loan competition : when is entry deregulation socially beneficial?},
  author={Kaas, Leo},
  note={Link zur Originalveröffentlichung:<br /> http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp403.pdf}
}
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Interner Vermerk

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Link zur Originalveröffentlichung:
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp403.pdf
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