Publikation: Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies
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2017
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Economics Letters. 2017, 156, pp. 176-178. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.011
Zusammenfassung
This paper describes a hierarchy with peer hiring to explore the reasons behind the management rule “A’s hire A’s and B’s hire C’s”. Workers are promoted based on talent and therefore like to hire less talented co-workers. This is why B’s hire C’s. The same logic should cause A’s to hire B’s, but there is a trade-off in the model: A’s are more likely to be promoted, and a manager profits from more talented subordinates. If this effect is strong enough, then indeed A’s hire A’s
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GOLDLÜCKE, Susanne, 2017. Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies. In: Economics Letters. 2017, 156, pp. 176-178. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.011BibTex
@article{Goldlucke2017Strat-39617,
year={2017},
doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.011},
title={Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies},
volume={156},
issn={0165-1765},
journal={Economics Letters},
pages={176--178},
author={Goldlücke, Susanne}
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