Publikation: Fiscal Constitutionalism in EMU
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The Maastricht process set up economic and fiscal criteria that member states of the European Union are expected to meet in the preparation for and when having joined the third stage of EMU. According to EMU rules, the Commission monitors the fiscal behavior of the participants but member states themselves--as members of the Council of Ministers--finally vote on the Commission recommendations. It is therefore questionable whether these criteria actually constrain member state governments from running excessive deficits. This paper adopts a constitutionalist perspective to address this question by asking how member states will interpret or even change the fiscal rules of the EMU in the future. Council decision-making in the area of EMU politics is analyzed using data on the economic and fiscal positions of current member states and acceding countries from Eastern and Southern Europe. The findings suggest that enlargement will shift policy outcomes, but, if compared to the situation at the time of the signing of the Maastricht treaty, the effect is rather marginal.
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BRÄUNINGER, Thomas, 2004. Fiscal Constitutionalism in EMU. In: International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior. 2004, 7(4), pp. 530-554BibTex
@article{Brauninger2004Fisca-3895, year={2004}, title={Fiscal Constitutionalism in EMU}, number={4}, volume={7}, journal={International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior}, pages={530--554}, author={Bräuninger, Thomas} }
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