Publikation: Incentives for subjects in internet experiments
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2009
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Economics Letters. 2009, 105(1), pp. 120-122. ISSN 0165-1765. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.012
Zusammenfassung
Providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky. One simple method is a high score (as in computer games). We test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Incentives, Experiments, Internet, High score
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DÜRSCH, Peter, Jörg OECHSSLER, Burkhard C. SCHIPPER, 2009. Incentives for subjects in internet experiments. In: Economics Letters. 2009, 105(1), pp. 120-122. ISSN 0165-1765. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.012BibTex
@article{Dursch2009Incen-23214, year={2009}, doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2009.06.012}, title={Incentives for subjects in internet experiments}, number={1}, volume={105}, issn={0165-1765}, journal={Economics Letters}, pages={120--122}, author={Dürsch, Peter and Oechssler, Jörg and Schipper, Burkhard C.} }
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