Publikation: Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? : evidence from the laboratory
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2013
Autor:innen
Weiss, Arne Robert
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Economics Bulletin. 2013, 33(1), pp. 794-796. eISSN 1545-2921
Zusammenfassung
In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement effect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an effect, if it exists, is not robust.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Elections, Electoral campaigns, Dictator game, Social distance, Entitlement, Experiment
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WEISS, Arne Robert, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2013. Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? : evidence from the laboratory. In: Economics Bulletin. 2013, 33(1), pp. 794-796. eISSN 1545-2921BibTex
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year={2013},
title={Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? : evidence from the laboratory},
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number={1},
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journal={Economics Bulletin},
pages={794--796},
author={Weiss, Arne Robert and Wolff, Irenaeus}
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URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
2016-01-28
