Publikation:

Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation

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2015

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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2688
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Managerial and Decision Economics. 2015, 36(7), pp. 487-498. ISSN 0143-6570. eISSN 1099-1468. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.2688

Zusammenfassung

People do not like to delegate the distribution of favors. To explain this reluctance, we disentangle reward motives in an experiment in which an investor can directly transfer money to a trustee or delegate this decision to another investor. Varying the transfer values of the investor and delegate, we find that the trustee's rewards follow a rather simple pattern. In all situations, both investors are rewarded, but the person who ultimately decides gets a higher reward. Unlike studies on the punishment of delegated unkind decisions, our results do not reveal a more sophisticated reward behavior that takes people's responsibility into account.

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330 Wirtschaft

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ISO 690EISENKOPF, Gerald, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2015. Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation. In: Managerial and Decision Economics. 2015, 36(7), pp. 487-498. ISSN 0143-6570. eISSN 1099-1468. Available under: doi: 10.1002/mde.2688
BibTex
@article{Eisenkopf2015Naive-29882,
  year={2015},
  doi={10.1002/mde.2688},
  title={Naïve Responses to Kind Delegation},
  number={7},
  volume={36},
  issn={0143-6570},
  journal={Managerial and Decision Economics},
  pages={487--498},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
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