Publikation: Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? : Evidence from the laboratory
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2013
Autor:innen
Weiss, Arne Robert
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Zusammenfassung
In Geng, Weiss, and Wolff (2011), we pointed to the possibility that a voting mechanism may create or strengthen an entitlement eff ect in political-power holders relative to a random-appointment mechanism. This comment documents that such an eff ect, if it exists, is not robust.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Elections, Electoral campaigns, Dictator game, Social distance, Entitlement, Experiment
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undefined / . - undefined, undefined
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WEISS, Arne Robert, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2013. Does being elected increase subjective entitlements? : Evidence from the laboratoryBibTex
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year={2013},
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