Committee Decision-Making Under the Threat of Leaks

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2020
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
IZA Discussion Paper
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung

Leaks are pervasive in politics. Hence, many committees that nominally operate under secrecy de facto operate under the threat that information might be passed on to outsiders. We study theoretically and experimentally how this possibility affects the behavior of committee members and the decision-making accuracy. Our theoretical analysis generates two major predictions. First, a committee operating under the threat of leaks is equivalent to a formally transparent committee in terms of the probabilities of project implementation as well as welfare (despite differences in individual voting behavior). Second, the threat of leaks causes a committee to recommend rejection of a project whenever precise information has been shared among committee members. As a consequence, a status-quo bias arises. Our laboratory results confirm these predictions despite subjects communicating less strategically than predicted.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
committee decision-making, strategic communication, voting, leaks, transparency, monetary policy committees, information aggregation
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690FEHRLER, Sebastian, Volker HAHN, 2020. Committee Decision-Making Under the Threat of Leaks
BibTex
@techreport{Fehrler2020Commi-51329,
  year={2020},
  series={IZA Discussion Paper},
  title={Committee Decision-Making Under the Threat of Leaks},
  number={No. 13746},
  url={https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/dp13746.pdf?abstractid=3704127&mirid=1&type=2},
  author={Fehrler, Sebastian and Hahn, Volker}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/51329">
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:contributor>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:issued>2020</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:title>Committee Decision-Making Under the Threat of Leaks</dcterms:title>
    <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-10-13T12:41:40Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2020-10-13T12:41:40Z</dc:date>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:creator>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Leaks are pervasive in politics. Hence, many committees that nominally operate under secrecy de facto operate under the threat that information might be passed on to outsiders. We study theoretically and experimentally how this possibility affects the behavior of committee members and the decision-making accuracy. Our theoretical analysis generates two major predictions. First, a committee operating under the threat of leaks is equivalent to a formally transparent committee in terms of the probabilities of project implementation as well as welfare (despite differences in individual voting behavior). Second, the threat of leaks causes a committee to recommend rejection of a project whenever precise information has been shared among committee members. As a consequence, a status-quo bias arises. Our laboratory results confirm these predictions despite subjects communicating less strategically than predicted.</dcterms:abstract>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/51329"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43613"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen