Publikation:

Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany

Lade...
Vorschaubild

Dateien

Martensen_0-276001.pdf
Martensen_0-276001.pdfGröße: 711.23 KBDownloads: 277

Datum

2014

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Auflagebezeichnung

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Zusammenfassung

Why do firms and workers bargain individually or collectively? I test the effect of product market competition and rents with German establishment data. Against intuition, competition and rents have opposite effects. Competition has a u-shaped effect on the probability of collective bargaining. This contradicts the existing theory (Ebell and Haefke 2006; Boeri and Burda 2009). By contrast, firms with higher rents are more prone to collective bargaining. For both competition and rents, the effect is stronger for sector-level than for firm-level collective bargaining. Indicators of higher productivity also matter: A higher export share drives firms into individual wage bargaining, while a higher share of workers with higher education drives firms into firm-level bargaining. Thus, the interplay between productivity, competition, and the wage setting regime is much more subtle than suggested by the existing theory.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Collective bargaining, Wage determinations, Rents, Product market competition, Establishment data

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690MARTENSEN, Finn, 2014. Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany
BibTex
@techreport{Martensen2014Oppos-30045,
  year={2014},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany},
  number={2014-15},
  author={Martensen, Finn}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/30045">
    <dcterms:title>Opposite Effects of Competition and Rents on Collective Bargaining : Evidence from Germany</dcterms:title>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30045"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:contributor>Martensen, Finn</dc:contributor>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-25T10:31:02Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Martensen, Finn</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30045/3/Martensen_0-276001.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Why do firms and workers bargain individually or collectively? I test the effect of product market competition and rents with German establishment data. Against intuition, competition and rents have opposite effects. Competition has a u-shaped effect on the probability of collective bargaining. This contradicts the existing theory (Ebell and Haefke 2006; Boeri and Burda 2009). By contrast, firms with higher rents are more prone to collective bargaining. For both competition and rents, the effect is stronger for sector-level than for firm-level collective bargaining. Indicators of higher productivity also matter: A higher export share drives firms into individual wage bargaining, while a higher share of workers with higher education drives firms into firm-level bargaining. Thus, the interplay between productivity, competition, and the wage setting regime is much more subtle than suggested by the existing theory.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-25T10:31:02Z</dcterms:available>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30045/3/Martensen_0-276001.pdf"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen