Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Baskaran_0-276032.pdf
Baskaran_0-276032.pdfGröße: 3.01 MBDownloads: 498
Datum
2014
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung

We study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Our dataset combines local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in the German state of Hesse. Our identification strategy is a regression discontinuity design that relies on a perturbation procedure to classify close elections. We find that left-wing state governments favored aligned municipalities while right-wing state governments favored unaligned ones. One plausible explanation for this difference in the behavior of left- and right-wing governments is that only few local councils had absolute right-wing majorities during the tenure of the right-wing state governments. Therefore, right-wing state governments had to use transfers to “buy off” unaligned municipalities, while left-wing state governments could use transfers to enhance their electoral prospects.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Intergovernmental transfers, political alignment, partisan behavior, state and local governments
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690BASKARAN, Thushyanthan, Zohal HESSAMI, 2014. Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany
BibTex
@techreport{Baskaran2014Polit-30042,
  year={2014},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany},
  number={2014-17},
  author={Baskaran, Thushyanthan and Hessami, Zohal}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/30042">
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-25T10:21:41Z</dc:date>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/30042"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2014</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:contributor>Baskaran, Thushyanthan</dc:contributor>
    <dc:contributor>Hessami, Zohal</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:creator>Hessami, Zohal</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Baskaran, Thushyanthan</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2015-02-25T10:21:41Z</dcterms:available>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30042/3/Baskaran_0-276032.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:title>Political alignment and intergovernmental transfers in parliamentary systems : evidence from Germany</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We study partisan favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers. Our dataset combines local council election data with fiscal data on grant allocations in the German state of Hesse. Our identification strategy is a regression discontinuity design that relies on a perturbation procedure to classify close elections. We find that left-wing state governments favored aligned municipalities while right-wing state governments favored unaligned ones. One plausible explanation for this difference in the behavior of left- and right-wing governments is that only few local councils had absolute right-wing majorities during the tenure of the right-wing state governments. Therefore, right-wing state governments had to use transfers to “buy off” unaligned municipalities, while left-wing state governments could use transfers to enhance their electoral prospects.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/30042/3/Baskaran_0-276032.pdf"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen