Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers

Breunig, Christian; Koski, Chris

Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers

Files

There are no files associated with this item.

Date

2009

Authors

Breunig, Christian

Koski, Chris

Publication type

Journal article

Published in

American Politics Research ; 37 (2009), 6. - pp. 1116-1138. - ISSN 1532-673X. - eISSN 1552-3373

Abstract

State budgets are flexible: In the same year, some budget categories dramatically rise or fall, whereas others closely follow the previous year’s appropriation. Public policy scholars label a budget that contains mainly small scale changes interspersed with dramatic fluctuations as punctuated. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these punctuated budgets in the American states. What causes both incremental and large scale budgetary change? We argue that a governor’s agenda setting and veto powers increase the extent to which state budgets are punctuated. First, institutionally strong governors can dominate budgetary agendas but are subject to heightened information costs. Second, strong governors can also block legislative alternatives, but thereby induce transactions costs that hinder fiscal policy adjustments. The article analyzes these institutional constraints at the American state level using maximum likelihood estimation on panel data from 1983 to 1999. We make two contributions to the study of American public policy. First, we offer a broad empirical analysis of the causes of punctuated change. Second, we present a method by which to measure punctuated distributions over time. This method can be applied to other areas of public policy research.

Subject (DDC)

320 Politics

Keywords

budgeting,governors,gubernatorial powers,punctuated equilibrium,public policy,state politics

Cite This

ISO 690

BREUNIG, Christian, Chris KOSKI, 2009. Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers. In: American Politics Research. 37(6), pp. 1116-1138. ISSN 1532-673X. eISSN 1552-3373. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1532673X09333583

BibTex

@article{Breunig2009Punct-23170,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1177/1532673X09333583},
  title={Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers},
  number={6},
  volume={37},
  issn={1532-673X},
  journal={American Politics Research},
  pages={1116--1138},
  author={Breunig, Christian and Koski, Chris}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/23170">
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-05-21T09:14:23Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:title>Punctuated Budgets and Governors' Institutional Powers</dcterms:title>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:creator>Koski, Chris</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Breunig, Christian</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">State budgets are flexible: In the same year, some budget categories dramatically rise or fall, whereas others closely follow the previous year’s appropriation. Public policy scholars label a budget that contains mainly small scale changes interspersed with dramatic fluctuations as punctuated. This research seeks to identify the determinants of these punctuated budgets in the American states. What causes both incremental and large scale budgetary change? We argue that a governor’s agenda setting and veto powers increase the extent to which state budgets are punctuated. First, institutionally strong governors can dominate budgetary agendas but are subject to heightened information costs. Second, strong governors can also block legislative alternatives, but thereby induce transactions costs that hinder fiscal policy adjustments. The article analyzes these institutional constraints at the American state level using maximum likelihood estimation on panel data from 1983 to 1999. We make two contributions to the study of American public policy. First, we offer a broad empirical analysis of the causes of punctuated change. Second, we present a method by which to measure punctuated distributions over time. This method can be applied to other areas of public policy research.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:creator>Breunig, Christian</dc:creator>
    <dc:contributor>Koski, Chris</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>American Politics Research ; 37 (2009), 6. - S. 1116-1138</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-05-21T09:14:23Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2009</dcterms:issued>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/23170"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Bibliography of Konstanz

No