Publikation: Large extensive form games
Lade...
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2013
Autor:innen
Ritzberger, Klaus
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Economic Theory. 2013, 52(1), pp. 75-102. ISSN 0938-2259. eISSN 1432-0479. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y
Zusammenfassung
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Extensive form games, Sequential decision theory, Trees
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690
ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Klaus RITZBERGER, 2013. Large extensive form games. In: Economic Theory. 2013, 52(1), pp. 75-102. ISSN 0938-2259. eISSN 1432-0479. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-011-0674-yBibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2013-01Large-41972, year={2013}, doi={10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y}, title={Large extensive form games}, number={1}, volume={52}, issn={0938-2259}, journal={Economic Theory}, pages={75--102}, author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ritzberger, Klaus} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/41972"> <dc:contributor>Ritzberger, Klaus</dc:contributor> <dc:creator>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:creator> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:creator>Ritzberger, Klaus</dc:creator> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2018-04-09T13:05:37Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:title>Large extensive form games</dcterms:title> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/41972"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves.</dcterms:abstract> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2018-04-09T13:05:37Z</dc:date> <dcterms:issued>2013-01</dcterms:issued> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:contributor>Alós-Ferrer, Carlos</dc:contributor> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein