Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding : Evidence from Italy and France
Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding : Evidence from Italy and France
No Thumbnail Available
Files
There are no files associated with this item.
Date
2017
Authors
Editors
Journal ISSN
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliographical data
Publisher
Series
DOI (citable link)
International patent number
Link to the license
oops
EU project number
Project
Open Access publication
Collections
Title in another language
Publication type
Journal article
Publication status
Published
Published in
Journal of Common Market Studies : JCMS ; 55 (2017), 2. - pp. 275-293. - ISSN 0021-9886. - eISSN 1468-5965
Abstract
Extensive research suggests that political factors bias the domestic allocation of the European Structural and Investment Funds (SIF) in ways that may not be in line with EU goals. This article offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of the role of electoral institutions in shaping county-level allocations of SIF. Drawing on theories of distributive politics and federalism, this article argues that electoral institutions provide politicians in the executive branch of national government with incentives to use at least a part of the SIF to buy votes in NUTS 3-level counties, whereby vote-buying is more common under majority voting than under proportional representation. The results of a statistical analysis of SIF allocations across 202 Italian and French NUTS 3-level counties during 2007–13 confirm this argument. The article concludes by discussing the findings and their implications for future research on EU budgetary implementation and cohesion policy.
Summary in another language
Subject (DDC)
320 Politics
Keywords
Conference
Review
undefined / . - undefined, undefined. - (undefined; undefined)
Cite This
ISO 690
DELLMUTH, Lisa Maria, Dominik SCHRAFF, Michael F. STOFFEL, 2017. Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding : Evidence from Italy and France. In: Journal of Common Market Studies : JCMS. 55(2), pp. 275-293. ISSN 0021-9886. eISSN 1468-5965. Available under: doi: 10.1111/jcms.12433BibTex
@article{Dellmuth2017-03Distr-38685, year={2017}, doi={10.1111/jcms.12433}, title={Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding : Evidence from Italy and France}, number={2}, volume={55}, issn={0021-9886}, journal={Journal of Common Market Studies : JCMS}, pages={275--293}, author={Dellmuth, Lisa Maria and Schraff, Dominik and Stoffel, Michael F.}, note={Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 8th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations in Berlin 2014 and the ECPR Annual Conference in Glasgow 2014.} }
RDF
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/" xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#" xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/38685"> <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/38685"/> <dc:creator>Dellmuth, Lisa Maria</dc:creator> <dc:creator>Schraff, Dominik</dc:creator> <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/> <dc:contributor>Stoffel, Michael F.</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Schraff, Dominik</dc:contributor> <dc:contributor>Dellmuth, Lisa Maria</dc:contributor> <dcterms:title>Distributive Politics, Electoral Institutions and European Structural and Investment Funding : Evidence from Italy and France</dcterms:title> <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-05-02T09:54:47Z</dcterms:available> <dcterms:issued>2017-03</dcterms:issued> <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/> <dc:creator>Stoffel, Michael F.</dc:creator> <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Extensive research suggests that political factors bias the domestic allocation of the European Structural and Investment Funds (SIF) in ways that may not be in line with EU goals. This article offers the first systematic and comparative analysis of the role of electoral institutions in shaping county-level allocations of SIF. Drawing on theories of distributive politics and federalism, this article argues that electoral institutions provide politicians in the executive branch of national government with incentives to use at least a part of the SIF to buy votes in NUTS 3-level counties, whereby vote-buying is more common under majority voting than under proportional representation. The results of a statistical analysis of SIF allocations across 202 Italian and French NUTS 3-level counties during 2007–13 confirm this argument. The article concludes by discussing the findings and their implications for future research on EU budgetary implementation and cohesion policy.</dcterms:abstract> <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2017-05-02T09:54:47Z</dc:date> <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/> <dc:language>eng</dc:language> </rdf:Description> </rdf:RDF>
Internal note
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Examination date of dissertation
Method of financing
Comment on publication
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 8th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations in Berlin 2014 and the ECPR Annual Conference in Glasgow 2014.
Alliance license
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
International Co-Authors
Bibliography of Konstanz
No