Publikation:

Committees, sequential voting and transparency

Vorschaubild

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2008

Autor:innen

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

Auflagebezeichnung

URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-246483
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Mathematical Social Sciences. 2008, 56(3), pp. 366-385. ISSN 0165-4896. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008

Zusammenfassung

We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

Zeitschriftenheft

Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690HAHN, Volker, 2008. Committees, sequential voting and transparency. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 2008, 56(3), pp. 366-385. ISSN 0165-4896. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008
BibTex
@article{Hahn2008Commi-24648,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008},
  title={Committees, sequential voting and transparency},
  number={3},
  volume={56},
  issn={0165-4896},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  pages={366--385},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/24648">
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>Mathematical Social Sciences ; 56 (2008), 3. - S. 366-385</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:contributor>Hahn, Volker</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:title>Committees, sequential voting and transparency</dcterms:title>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-10-08T08:59:44Z</dc:date>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2013-10-08T08:59:44Z</dcterms:available>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/24648"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:creator>Hahn, Volker</dc:creator>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Interner Vermerk

xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter

Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.

Prüfdatum der URL

Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation

Finanzierungsart

Kommentar zur Publikation

Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Nein
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen