Committees, sequential voting and transparency

Hahn, Volker

Committees, sequential voting and transparency

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Date

2008

Publication type

Journal article

Published in

Mathematical Social Sciences ; 56 (2008), 3. - pp. 366-385. - ISSN 0165-4896

Abstract

We propose a model of sequential voting in committees, where members use their individual votes to signal high efficiency in their bid to become re-appointed. Transparency precludes efficient information aggregation, and thus decreases the utility of the principal in the first period; it may be beneficial to her in the second period. Under transparency, equilibria under sequential voting always differ from those under simultaneous voting and may lead to more or less efficient information aggregation.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Cite This

ISO 690

HAHN, Volker, 2008. Committees, sequential voting and transparency. In: Mathematical Social Sciences. 56(3), pp. 366-385. ISSN 0165-4896. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008

BibTex

@article{Hahn2008Commi-24648,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.008},
  title={Committees, sequential voting and transparency},
  number={3},
  volume={56},
  issn={0165-4896},
  journal={Mathematical Social Sciences},
  pages={366--385},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}

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