The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos; Ania, Ana B.

The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

Dateien

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Datum

2005

Autor:innen

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos

Ania, Ana B.

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Economic Theory. 2005, 26(3), pp. 497-516. ISSN 0938-2259. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

Zusammenfassung

In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Aggregative games, Evolutionary stable strategy, Price-taking behavior, Stochastic Stability, Supermodularity

Zitieren

ISO 690

ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Ana B. ANIA, 2005. The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior. In: Economic Theory. 2005, 26(3), pp. 497-516. ISSN 0938-2259. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

BibTex

@article{AlosFerrer2005evolu-16709,
  year={2005},
  doi={10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8},
  title={The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior},
  number={3},
  volume={26},
  issn={0938-2259},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  pages={497--516},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ania, Ana B.}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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