Publikation:

The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior

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Datum

2005

Autor:innen

Ania, Ana B.

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URI (zitierfähiger Link)
http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-167098
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8
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Published

Erschienen in

Economic Theory. 2005, 26(3), pp. 497-516. ISSN 0938-2259. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8

Zusammenfassung

In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions. The results obtained are also useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Aggregative games, Evolutionary stable strategy, Price-taking behavior, Stochastic Stability, Supermodularity

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ISO 690ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Ana B. ANIA, 2005. The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior. In: Economic Theory. 2005, 26(3), pp. 497-516. ISSN 0938-2259. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8
BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2005evolu-16709,
  year={2005},
  doi={10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8},
  title={The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior},
  number={3},
  volume={26},
  issn={0938-2259},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  pages={497--516},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Ania, Ana B.}
}
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