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Commitment or expertise? : Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises

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2019

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Alexiadou, Despina

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12338
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Open Access-Veröffentlichung

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Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaft: Publikationen
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European Journal of Political Research. 2019, 58(3), pp. 845-865. ISSN 0304-4130. eISSN 1475-6765. Available under: doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12338

Zusammenfassung

Why do prime ministers or presidents appoint non‐elected experts, also known as technocrats, during economic crises? Do they appoint them for their expertise or for their commitment to pro‐market reforms? Answering this question is crucial for understanding and predicting the longer‐term role of technocrats in democracies. With the aid of unique data on the political and personal background of finance ministers in 13 parliamentary and semi‐presidential European democracies this article shows that commitment, not expertise is the primary driver of technocratic appointments during major economic crises. Technocrats are preferred over experienced politicians when the latter lack commitment to policy reform. An important implication of the findings is that technocratic appointments to top economic portfolios in West European countries are unlikely to become the norm outside economic crises, assuming economic crises are short‐lived and not recurring.

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320 Politik

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technocrats, finance ministers, monetary and financial crises, ministerial selection, electoral systems

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ISO 690ALEXIADOU, Despina, Hakan GUNAYDIN, 2019. Commitment or expertise? : Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises. In: European Journal of Political Research. 2019, 58(3), pp. 845-865. ISSN 0304-4130. eISSN 1475-6765. Available under: doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12338
BibTex
@article{Alexiadou2019-04-25Commi-46703,
  year={2019},
  doi={10.1111/1475-6765.12338},
  title={Commitment or expertise? : Technocratic appointments as political responses to economic crises},
  number={3},
  volume={58},
  issn={0304-4130},
  journal={European Journal of Political Research},
  pages={845--865},
  author={Alexiadou, Despina and Gunaydin, Hakan}
}
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