On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure

Nicklisch, Andreas; Wolff, Irenaeus

On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure

Files

Nicklisch_0-320244.pdf(281.25 KB)

Date

2012

Authors

Nicklisch, Andreas

Wolff, Irenaeus

Publication type

Journal article

Publication status

Published

Published in

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 84 (2012), 3. - pp. 892-905. - ISSN 0167-2681. - eISSN 1879-1751

Abstract

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these participants strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher fixed costs of punishment more frequently lead to extreme responses. The fractions of purely selfish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways of incorporating our findings into the existing models.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

Distributional fairness, Experiments, Intention-based fairness, Reciprocity, Ultimatum bargaining

Cite This

ISO 690

NICKLISCH, Andreas, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 84(3), pp. 892-905. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009

BibTex

@article{Nicklisch2012-12natur-33041,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009},
  title={On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure},
  number={3},
  volume={84},
  issn={0167-2681},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
  pages={892--905},
  author={Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus}
}

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