On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure

2012
Authors
Nicklisch, Andreas
Journal article
Published
Published in
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ; 84 (2012), 3. - pp. 892-905. - ISSN 0167-2681. - eISSN 1879-1751
Abstract
We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these participants strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher fixed costs of punishment more frequently lead to extreme responses. The fractions of purely selfish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways of incorporating our findings into the existing models.
330 Economics
Keywords
Distributional fairness, Experiments, Intention-based fairness, Reciprocity, Ultimatum bargaining
Cite This
ISO 690NICKLISCH, Andreas, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 84(3), pp. 892-905. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009
BibTex
@article{Nicklisch2012-12natur-33041,
year={2012},
doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009},
title={On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure},
number={3},
volume={84},
issn={0167-2681},
journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
pages={892--905},
author={Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus}
}

RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these participants strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher fixed costs of punishment more frequently lead to extreme responses. The fractions of purely selfish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways of incorporating our findings into the existing models.</dcterms:abstract>
<dc:contributor>Nicklisch, Andreas</dc:contributor>
<dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/33041/3/Nicklisch_0-320244.pdf"/>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dc:creator>Nicklisch, Andreas</dc:creator>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/33041/3/Nicklisch_0-320244.pdf"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/33041"/>
<dcterms:title>On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure</dcterms:title>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-02-18T14:59:15Z</dc:date>
<dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-02-18T14:59:15Z</dcterms:available>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dcterms:issued>2012-12</dcterms:issued>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>