On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure

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2012
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Nicklisch, Andreas
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We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are incomplete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatum game that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punishment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the degree of first-mover unkindness determines the severity of punishment actions even when marginal costs are absent. The proportion of these participants strongly depends on a treatment variation: higher fixed costs of punishment more frequently lead to extreme responses. The fractions of purely selfish and inequity-averse participants are small and stable. Among the variety of reciprocity models, only one accommodates (rather than predicts) parts of our findings. We discuss ways of incorporating our findings into the existing models.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Distributional fairness, Experiments, Intention-based fairness, Reciprocity, Ultimatum bargaining
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ISO 690NICKLISCH, Andreas, Irenaeus WOLFF, 2012. On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2012, 84(3), pp. 892-905. ISSN 0167-2681. eISSN 1879-1751. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009
BibTex
@article{Nicklisch2012-12natur-33041,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.jebo.2012.10.009},
  title={On the nature of reciprocity : evidence from the ultimatum reciprocity measure},
  number={3},
  volume={84},
  issn={0167-2681},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization},
  pages={892--905},
  author={Nicklisch, Andreas and Wolff, Irenaeus}
}
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