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Sequential aggregation of verifiable information

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2011

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-246334
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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.004
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Journal of Public Economics. 2011, 95(11-12), pp. 1447-1454. ISSN 0047-2727. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.004

Zusammenfassung

We introduce the notion of verifiable information into a model of sequential debate among experts who are motivated by career concerns. We show that self-censorship may hamper the efficiency of information aggregation, as experts withhold evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom. In this case, silence is telling and undermines the prevailing view over time if this view is incorrect. As a result, withholding arguments about the correct state of the world is only a temporary phenomenon, and the probability of a correct decision always converges to one as the group of experts becomes large. For small groups, a simple mechanism the principal can use to improve decision-making is to appoint a devil's advocate.

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ISO 690HAHN, Volker, 2011. Sequential aggregation of verifiable information. In: Journal of Public Economics. 2011, 95(11-12), pp. 1447-1454. ISSN 0047-2727. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.004
BibTex
@article{Hahn2011Seque-24633,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.06.004},
  title={Sequential aggregation of verifiable information},
  number={11-12},
  volume={95},
  issn={0047-2727},
  journal={Journal of Public Economics},
  pages={1447--1454},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}
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