Publikation: Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents
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2012
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Leider, Stephen
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American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 2012, 4(2), pp. 146-183. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Available under: doi: 10.1257/mic.4.2.146
Zusammenfassung
We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent.
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330 Wirtschaft
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ENGLMAIER, Florian, Stephen LEIDER, 2012. Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents. In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 2012, 4(2), pp. 146-183. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Available under: doi: 10.1257/mic.4.2.146BibTex
@article{Englmaier2012Contr-13484.2,
year={2012},
doi={10.1257/mic.4.2.146},
title={Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents},
url={https://www.jstor.org/stable/23249437},
number={2},
volume={4},
issn={1945-7669},
journal={American Economic Journal: Microeconomics},
pages={146--183},
author={Englmaier, Florian and Leider, Stephen}
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<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">We solve for the optimal contract when agents are reciprocal, demonstrating that generous compensation can substitute for performance-based pay. Our results suggest several factors that make firms more likely to use reciprocal incentives. Reciprocity is most powerful when output is a poor signal of effort and when the agent is highly reciprocal and/or productive. Similarly, reciprocal incentives are attractive when firm managers have strong incentive pay and discretion over employee compensation. While reciprocal incentives can be optimal even when identical firms compete, a reciprocity contract is most likely when one firm has a match-specific productivity advantage with the agent.</dcterms:abstract>
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