Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism

Briesen, Jochen

Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism

Dateien

Briesen_2-bvgl680576nr9.pdfGröße: 998.21 KBDownloads: 11

Datum

2024

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Gold

Sammlungen

Philosophie

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. University of Michigan Library. 2024, 11(0), 19. eISSN 2330-4014. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.3998/ergo.6159

Zusammenfassung

Aesthetic statements of the form ‘X is beautiful’ are evaluative; they indicate the speaker’s positive affective attitude regarding X. Why is this so? Is the evaluative content part of the truth conditions, or is it a pragmatic phenomenon (i.e. presupposition, implicature)? First, I argue that semantic approaches as well as these pragmatic ones cannot satisfactorily explain the evaluativity of aesthetic statements. Second, I offer a positive proposal based on a speech-act theoretical version of hybrid expressivism, which states that, with the literal utterance of ‘X is beautiful’, we perform two illocutionary acts simultaneously, an assertive and an expressive one. I will specify this theory in detail and argue that it can satisfactorily account for the evaluative content of aesthetic statements. I will also discuss the advantages of the theory over other variants of expressivism in meta-aesthetics.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Zitieren

ISO 690

BRIESEN, Jochen, 2024. Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism. In: Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. University of Michigan Library. 2024, 11(0), 19. eISSN 2330-4014. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.3998/ergo.6159

BibTex

@article{Briesen2024-07-18Aesth-70696,
  year={2024},
  doi={10.3998/ergo.6159},
  title={Aesthetic Judgments, Evaluative Content, and (Hybrid) Expressivism},
  number={0},
  volume={11},
  journal={Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy},
  author={Briesen, Jochen},
  note={Article Number: 19}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja

Begutachtet

Nein