Publikation:

Shifting the Blame : On Delegation and Responsibility

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2012

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Bartling, Björn

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The Review of Economic Studies. 2012, 79(1), S. 67-87. ISSN 0034-6527. eISSN 1467-937X. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/restud/rdr023

Zusammenfassung

To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects could either choose a fair allocation or an unfair allocation or delegate the choice, and we used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this can constitute a strong motive for the delegation of a decision right. Moreover, we propose a simple measure of responsibility and show that this measure outperforms measures based on inequity aversion or reciprocity in predicting punishment behaviour.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Delegation, Responsibility, Punishment, Decision rights

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ISO 690BARTLING, Björn, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2012. Shifting the Blame : On Delegation and Responsibility. In: The Review of Economic Studies. 2012, 79(1), S. 67-87. ISSN 0034-6527. eISSN 1467-937X. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/restud/rdr023
BibTex
@article{Bartling2012Shift-21669,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1093/restud/rdr023},
  title={Shifting the Blame : On Delegation and Responsibility},
  number={1},
  volume={79},
  issn={0034-6527},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
  pages={67--87},
  author={Bartling, Björn and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
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