Shifting the Blame : On Delegation and Responsibility

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2012
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Bartling, Björn
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The Review of Economic Studies. 2012, 79(1), S. 67-87. ISSN 0034-6527. eISSN 1467-937X. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/restud/rdr023
Zusammenfassung

To fully understand the motives for delegating a decision right, it is important to study responsibility attributions for outcomes of delegated decisions. We conducted laboratory experiments in which subjects could either choose a fair allocation or an unfair allocation or delegate the choice, and we used a punishment option to elicit responsibility attributions. Our results show that, first, responsibility attribution can be effectively shifted and, second, this can constitute a strong motive for the delegation of a decision right. Moreover, we propose a simple measure of responsibility and show that this measure outperforms measures based on inequity aversion or reciprocity in predicting punishment behaviour.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
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Delegation, Responsibility, Punishment, Decision rights
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ISO 690BARTLING, Björn, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2012. Shifting the Blame : On Delegation and Responsibility. In: The Review of Economic Studies. 2012, 79(1), S. 67-87. ISSN 0034-6527. eISSN 1467-937X. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1093/restud/rdr023
BibTex
@article{Bartling2012Shift-21669,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1093/restud/rdr023},
  title={Shifting the Blame : On Delegation and Responsibility},
  number={1},
  volume={79},
  issn={0034-6527},
  journal={The Review of Economic Studies},
  pages={67--87},
  author={Bartling, Björn and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
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