Publikation: Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
Lade...
Dateien
Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.
Datum
2024
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG): EXC 2117-422037984
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
American Economic Journal : Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 2024, 16(3), S. 232-258. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1257/mic.20210117
Zusammenfassung
Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, this is sufficient to reach a high and stable cooperation rate. However, repeated communication is important to maintain a high level of cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where players face additional uncertainty about the history of play.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690
DVORAK, Fabian, Sebastian FEHRLER, 2024. Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions. In: American Economic Journal : Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 2024, 16(3), S. 232-258. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1257/mic.20210117BibTex
@article{Dvorak2024Negot-51330.2,
title={Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions},
year={2024},
doi={10.1257/mic.20210117},
number={3},
volume={16},
issn={1945-7669},
journal={American Economic Journal : Microeconomics},
pages={232--258},
author={Dvorak, Fabian and Fehrler, Sebastian}
}RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/51330.2">
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dc:contributor>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:title>Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions</dcterms:title>
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dc:creator>Fehrler, Sebastian</dc:creator>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2023-12-21T12:18:10Z</dc:date>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/51330.2"/>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43615"/>
<dcterms:issued>2024</dcterms:issued>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/43615"/>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dc:creator>Dvorak, Fabian</dc:creator>
<dc:contributor>Dvorak, Fabian</dc:contributor>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2023-12-21T12:18:10Z</dcterms:available>
<dcterms:abstract>Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, this is sufficient to reach a high and stable cooperation rate. However, repeated communication is important to maintain a high level of cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where players face additional uncertainty about the history of play.</dcterms:abstract>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Ja
