Path dependence in public-good games

Bruttel, Lisa; Friehe, Tim

Path dependence in public-good games

Dateien

TWI-RPS-067-Bruttel-Friehe-2011-08.pdf(1.99 MB)

Datum

2011

Autor:innen

Bruttel, Lisa

Friehe, Tim

Schriftenreihe

Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut; 67

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Zusammenfassung

This paper presents experimental evidence that contributions to a public good can be path-dependent for a limited time span. We study a repeated linear public-good game with punishment opportunities. Our data shows that subjects who had experienced a higher marginal return on public-good contributions in rounds 1-10 contributed more to the public good in rounds 11 and 12, even though they faced the same marginal return as the control group in these later rounds. In contrast, differences in contributions were not significant when comparing subjects bearing the same current costs of punishment points, but having had different costs in the past.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

public-good game,team,punishment,path dependence,experiment

Zitieren

ISO 690

BRUTTEL, Lisa, Tim FRIEHE, 2011. Path dependence in public-good games

BibTex

@techreport{Bruttel2011depen-16204,
  year={2011},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Path dependence in public-good games},
  number={67},
  author={Bruttel, Lisa and Friehe, Tim}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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