Regulation in the Market for Education and Optimal Choice of Curriculum

Eisenkopf, Gerald; Wohlschlegel, Ansgar

Regulation in the Market for Education and Optimal Choice of Curriculum

Dateien

Eisenkopf_0-270283.pdfGröße: 263.7 KBDownloads: 194

Datum

2011

Autor:innen

Eisenkopf, Gerald

Wohlschlegel, Ansgar

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Zusammenfassung

We analyze educational institutions’ incentives to set up demanding or lax curricula in duopolistic markets for education with endogenous enrolment of students. We assume that there is a positive externality of student achievement on the local economy. Comparing the case of regulated tuition fees with an unregulated market, we identify the following inefficiencies: Under regulated tuition fees schools will set up inefficiently lax curricula in an attempt to please low-quality students even if schools internalize some of the externality. On the other hand, unregulated schools set up excessively differentiated curricula in order to relax competition in tuition fees. Deregulation gets more attractive if a larger fraction of the externality is internalized.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Education, Local Externalities, Product Differentiation, Price Competition, Vouchers

Zitieren

ISO 690

EISENKOPF, Gerald, Ansgar WOHLSCHLEGEL, 2011. Regulation in the Market for Education and Optimal Choice of Curriculum

BibTex

@techreport{Eisenkopf2011Regul-29777,
  year={2011},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={Regulation in the Market for Education and Optimal Choice of Curriculum},
  number={2011-16},
  author={Eisenkopf, Gerald and Wohlschlegel, Ansgar}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja