Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Polarization-Conflict Nexus

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
rulesthatmatter_pageproofs.pdf
rulesthatmatter_pageproofs.pdfGröße: 214.53 KBDownloads: 1038
Datum
2008
Autor:innen
Wiesehomeier, Nina
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Zeitschriftenartikel
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung

One controversy in the study of civil war relates to the role that institutions play in ethnically diverse societies. 'Constitutional engineers' advance various institutional arrangements, ranging from democracy in general to specific constitutional and electoral rules as those mechanisms that help divided societies to resolve disputes peacefully. Political sociologists, by contrast, maintain that political institutions are largely an epiphenomenon. Synthesizing the two conflicting schools of thought, the authors examine how different institutions in conjunction with three forms of ethnic diversity fractionalization, dominance and polarization affect the risk of civil war. It is argued that groups perceive institutions as a constraint and that they consider the usage of political violence if they cannot achieve their goals peacefully. The examination of these conditional institutionalist hypotheses for the period between 1950 and 2000 shows in accordance with recent theoretical work that fractionalization can indeed be linked to low-intensity civil wars and that this effect is particularly strong in democracies in comparison to autocracies. Interacting the measures of diversity with different democratic institutions, the authors confirm that rules that encourage power-sharing lower the risk of war in diverse societies. The event history models moreover show that the combination of fractionalization and majoritarian voting forebodes badly for the internal stability of a state. Within the set of democratic regimes studied in this article, presidential systems are the most war-prone institutional setting.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik
Schlagwörter
Diversität, Fraktionalisierung, Polarisierung, Political institutions, fractionalization, polarization, duration models
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690SCHNEIDER, Gerald, Nina WIESEHOMEIER, 2008. Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Polarization-Conflict Nexus. In: Journal of Peace Research. 2008, 45(2), pp. 183-203. ISSN 0022-3433. eISSN 1460-3578. Available under: doi: 10.1177/0022343307087176
BibTex
@article{Schneider2008Rules-3965,
  year={2008},
  doi={10.1177/0022343307087176},
  title={Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Polarization-Conflict Nexus},
  number={2},
  volume={45},
  issn={0022-3433},
  journal={Journal of Peace Research},
  pages={183--203},
  author={Schneider, Gerald and Wiesehomeier, Nina}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/3965">
    <dc:creator>Schneider, Gerald</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">One controversy in the study of civil war relates to the role that institutions play in ethnically diverse societies. 'Constitutional engineers' advance various institutional arrangements, ranging from democracy in general to specific constitutional and electoral rules as those mechanisms that help divided societies to resolve disputes peacefully. Political sociologists, by contrast, maintain that political institutions are largely an epiphenomenon. Synthesizing the two conflicting schools of thought, the authors examine how different institutions in conjunction with three forms of ethnic diversity   fractionalization, dominance and polarization   affect the risk of civil war. It is argued that groups perceive institutions as a constraint and that they consider the usage of political violence if they cannot achieve their goals peacefully. The examination of these conditional institutionalist hypotheses for the period between 1950 and 2000 shows in accordance with recent theoretical work that fractionalization can indeed be linked to low-intensity civil wars and that this effect is particularly strong in democracies in comparison to autocracies. Interacting the measures of diversity with different democratic institutions, the authors confirm that rules that encourage power-sharing lower the risk of war in diverse societies. The event history models moreover show that the combination of fractionalization and majoritarian voting forebodes badly for the internal stability of a state. Within the set of democratic regimes studied in this article, presidential systems are the most war-prone institutional setting.</dcterms:abstract>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dc:language>deu</dc:language>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:09:49Z</dc:date>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/3965/1/rulesthatmatter_pageproofs.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:bibliographicCitation>First publ. in: Journal of Peace Research 45 (2008), 2, pp. 183-203</dcterms:bibliographicCitation>
    <dcterms:title>Rules that Matter: Political Institutions and the Polarization-Conflict Nexus</dcterms:title>
    <dc:contributor>Schneider, Gerald</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued>
    <dc:creator>Wiesehomeier, Nina</dc:creator>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="http://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/3965"/>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/3965/1/rulesthatmatter_pageproofs.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2011-03-24T10:09:49Z</dcterms:available>
    <dc:contributor>Wiesehomeier, Nina</dc:contributor>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Ja
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen