Intuitions and Circularity

Herasymova, Larysa

Intuitions and Circularity

Dateien

BA-Arbeit_Herasymova.pdfGröße: 238.28 KBDownloads: 410

Datum

2012

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Philosophie

Publikationstyp

Bachelorarbeit

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

In what follows I will discuss 1) – the everyday conception of intuition and intuitive ‘knowledge’ as opposed to philosophically interesting conception. 2) – I will divide ‘philosophical’ intuitions into several separate groups with varying degree of strength. 3) – I will argue a fairly uncontroversial point that intuitions are and were constantly employed throughout the history of philosophical practice at the very least from Plato’s days onwards, and certainly long before the start of the contemporary intuition-debate. 4) – I will address one of intuitions’ usability objections namely the worry that if intuitions give us access only to knowledge about particulars then such intuitions are not worth intuiting.

5) – By considering how several objections of circularity of intuitions’ methodology can be reversed onto themselves I will attempt to show the inescapability of philosophical analysis from one or the other sort of intuitions. 6) – I will sketch one possible solution of the problem offered by foundationalism, but will hint that such a solution is not the most intuitively gratifying one.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

100 Philosophie

Schlagwörter

intuition, thought experiment, Locke, the prince and the cobbler, calibration, Hintikka's objection, generality of intuition, foundationalism

Zitieren

ISO 690

HERASYMOVA, Larysa, 2012. Intuitions and Circularity [Bachelor thesis]

BibTex

@mastersthesis{Herasymova2012Intui-20256,
  year={2012},
  title={Intuitions and Circularity},
  author={Herasymova, Larysa}
}

RDF

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