Intrinsic Motivation in Party Politics : Explaining the full range of political behavior

Lade...
Vorschaubild
Dateien
Harder_0-363829.pdf
Harder_0-363829.pdfGröße: 3.66 MBDownloads: 1383
Datum
2016
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
Kontakt
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID
Internationale Patentnummer
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Gesperrt bis
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Forschungsvorhaben
Organisationseinheiten
Zeitschriftenheft
Publikationstyp
Dissertation
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung

The proliferation of new parties since the 1960's poses a challenge to established models of party behavior: too often, too many parties lose in elections. This seemingly nonstrategic behavior contributes to lively democratic societies, but is poorly understood by existing theories on political parties. This dissertation argues that insights from Self-Determination Theory can augment existing rational choice models of political behavior, and makes three specific contributions to better understanding the full range of political behavior. The first contribution shows that the empirical literature on the strategic entry of new parties is based on biased data, and that many findings from the strategic entry literature are likely driven by voter behavior rather than party behavior. The contribution argues that by excluding small and unsuccessful parties, the existing literature is based on data that systematically excludes observations that would contradict the strategic entry hypothesis. Once appropriate statistical models are applied to unbiased data, no support for strategic party entry is found. The second contribution uses an email experiment to observe whether successful and unsuccessful direct candidates have different sensitivities to extrinsic incentives. The experiment finds that unsuccessful candidates reply less often, but that - in contrast to successful candidates - they do not discriminate between responses that promise extrinsic benefits and those that do not. These findings are explained with the framework of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from Self-Determination Theory. According to this framework, intrinsic motivation is lost in more competitive environments. Thus, the discriminating behavior of successful candidates is explained by lower levels of intrinsic motivation. The third contribution examines whether the framework of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can help to understand party survival. Here, it is argued that party formation is a product of intrinsic motivation, but that once a party receives enough votes to win extrinsic benefit, intrinsic motivation is crowded out. Hence, such parties will only survive if extrinsic motivation can compensate for this loss. The analysis shows that the lifespan of parties that won enough votes to receive public party financing heavily depends on electoral success, while the survival of parties that have never received public financing depends much less on electoral success. The presented research suggests that, similar to the paradox of voting, there is a paradox of candidacy. It is argued that the intrinsic–extrinsic motivation framework can help to resolve this paradox and that the crowding-out effect represents a particularly interesting addition to existing theories.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
320 Politik
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690HARDER, Niklas, 2016. Intrinsic Motivation in Party Politics : Explaining the full range of political behavior [Dissertation]. Konstanz: University of Konstanz
BibTex
@phdthesis{Harder2016Intri-35374,
  year={2016},
  title={Intrinsic Motivation in Party Politics : Explaining the full range of political behavior},
  author={Harder, Niklas},
  address={Konstanz},
  school={Universität Konstanz}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/35374">
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-09-22T06:14:03Z</dcterms:available>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/35374"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:title>Intrinsic Motivation in Party Politics : Explaining the full range of political behavior</dcterms:title>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-09-22T06:14:03Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The proliferation of new parties since the 1960's poses a challenge to established models of party behavior: too often, too many parties lose in elections. This seemingly nonstrategic behavior contributes to lively democratic societies, but is poorly understood by existing theories on political parties. This dissertation argues that insights from Self-Determination Theory can augment existing rational choice models of political behavior, and makes three specific contributions to better understanding the full range of political behavior. The first contribution shows that the empirical literature on the strategic entry of new parties is based on biased data, and that many findings from the strategic entry literature are likely driven by voter behavior rather than party behavior. The contribution argues that by excluding small and unsuccessful parties, the existing literature is based on data that systematically excludes observations that would contradict the strategic entry hypothesis. Once appropriate statistical models are applied to unbiased data, no support for strategic party entry is found. The second contribution uses an email experiment to observe whether successful and unsuccessful direct candidates have different sensitivities to extrinsic incentives. The experiment finds that unsuccessful candidates reply less often, but that - in contrast to successful candidates - they do not discriminate between responses that promise extrinsic benefits and those that do not. These findings are explained with the framework of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation from Self-Determination Theory. According to this framework, intrinsic motivation is lost in more competitive environments. Thus, the discriminating behavior of successful candidates is explained by lower levels of intrinsic motivation. The third contribution examines whether the framework of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can help to understand party survival. Here, it is argued that party formation is a product of intrinsic motivation, but that once a party receives enough votes to win extrinsic benefit, intrinsic motivation is crowded out. Hence, such parties will only survive if extrinsic motivation can compensate for this loss. The analysis shows that the lifespan of parties that won enough votes to receive public party financing heavily depends on electoral success, while the survival of parties that have never received public financing depends much less on electoral success. The presented research suggests that, similar to the paradox of voting, there is a paradox of candidacy. It is argued that the intrinsic–extrinsic motivation framework can help to resolve this paradox and that the crowding-out effect represents a particularly interesting addition to existing theories.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/35374/3/Harder_0-363829.pdf"/>
    <dc:creator>Harder, Niklas</dc:creator>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2016</dcterms:issued>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/35374/3/Harder_0-363829.pdf"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:contributor>Harder, Niklas</dc:contributor>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Interner Vermerk
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Kontakt
URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
Prüfungsdatum der Dissertation
July 19, 2016
Hochschulschriftenvermerk
Konstanz, Univ., Diss., 2016
Finanzierungsart
Kommentar zur Publikation
Allianzlizenz
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
Internationale Co-Autor:innen
Universitätsbibliographie
Begutachtet
Diese Publikation teilen