Publikation:

Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

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2011

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Endres, Alfred

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Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2011, 62(1), pp. 30-40. ISSN 0095-0696. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2010.12.001

Zusammenfassung

Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

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Environmental liability law, Emission abatement technology, Diffusion

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ISO 690ENDRES, Alfred, Tim FRIEHE, 2011. Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2011, 62(1), pp. 30-40. ISSN 0095-0696. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jeem.2010.12.001
BibTex
@article{Endres2011Incen-17785,
  year={2011},
  doi={10.1016/j.jeem.2010.12.001},
  title={Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law},
  number={1},
  volume={62},
  issn={0095-0696},
  journal={Journal of Environmental Economics and Management},
  pages={30--40},
  author={Endres, Alfred and Friehe, Tim}
}
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