Minimum wages and welfare in a Hotelling duopsony

Kaas, Leo; Madden, Paul

Minimum wages and welfare in a Hotelling duopsony

Dateien

Kaas--.pdfGröße: 20.97 MBDownloads: 428

Datum

2010

Autor:innen

Kaas, Leo

Madden, Paul

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Economic Theory. 2010, 43(2), pp. 167-188. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2

Zusammenfassung

Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0, 1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Hotelling, duopsony, minimum wages

Zitieren

ISO 690

KAAS, Leo, Paul MADDEN, 2010. Minimum wages and welfare in a Hotelling duopsony. In: Economic Theory. 2010, 43(2), pp. 167-188. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2

BibTex

@article{Kaas2010Minim-12690,
  year={2010},
  doi={10.1007/s00199-008-0412-2},
  title={Minimum wages and welfare in a Hotelling duopsony},
  number={2},
  volume={43},
  journal={Economic Theory},
  pages={167--188},
  author={Kaas, Leo and Madden, Paul}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

Ja