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Three Sequential Cases : from Symmetry to Asymmetry

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Datum

2008

Autor:innen

Amann, Erwin
Qiao, Heng

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Working Paper/Technical Report
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Published

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Zusammenfassung

Three critical cases, involving asymmetric and symmetric cases, in the sequential stages of the n-player repeated auctions are analyzed and compared. These cases might arise in a process of sequential, identical or equivalent auctions, where the auction result may reveal information about the strength or competitiveness of the participants. The behaviours of different players are characterized. Generally a player bids more aggressively when facing a strong player rather than a weak player. However a player favours competing with a weak one rather than a strong one. By applying the concept of Conditional Stochastic Dominance, revenues of players and the seller between the three stages are compared. It is proved that in this sequential process the information structure of the auctions changes and the seller s revenue increases. Finally, this n-player asymmetric auction model can also be used to compare the revenues between high-bid and open auctions and especially the results first derived by Maskin and Riley (2000) in two-player case are proved to be valid in the n-player case.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Asymmetric auction, Revenue comparison, Symmetry, Asymmetry

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ISO 690AMANN, Erwin, Heng QIAO, 2008. Three Sequential Cases : from Symmetry to Asymmetry
BibTex
@techreport{Amann2008Three-12145,
  year={2008},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={Three Sequential Cases : from Symmetry to Asymmetry},
  number={37},
  author={Amann, Erwin and Qiao, Heng}
}
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