Reciprocity and voting

Hahn, Volker

Reciprocity and voting

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Date

2009

Publication type

Journal article

Published in

Games and Economic Behavior ; 67 (2009), 2. - pp. 467-480. - ISSN 0899-8256. - eISSN 1090-2473

Abstract

In this paper we present a two-period model where a left-wing and a right-wing political party are solely interested in the policies they pursue. We assume that voters display reciprocal behavior. By contrast, political parties are not motivated by reciprocity. We show that reciprocity may have dramatic consequences for models of voting behavior. The incentive to be kind to the median voter may ensure that a position closer to the median voter's position is adopted even if political parties are not directly interested in being elected and cannot commit to a political stance during an election campaign. Moreover, reciprocity increases incumbency advantages.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

Reciprocity,Voting,Median voter theorem

Cite This

ISO 690

HAHN, Volker, 2009. Reciprocity and voting. In: Games and Economic Behavior. 67(2), pp. 467-480. ISSN 0899-8256. eISSN 1090-2473. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.003

BibTex

@article{Hahn2009Recip-24641,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.003},
  title={Reciprocity and voting},
  number={2},
  volume={67},
  issn={0899-8256},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  pages={467--480},
  author={Hahn, Volker}
}

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