Job market signaling and employer learning
| dc.contributor.author | Alós-Ferrer, Carlos | |
| dc.contributor.author | Prat, Julien | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2020-04-22T12:32:42Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2020-04-22T12:32:42Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2012-09 | eng |
| dc.description.abstract | We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough. | eng |
| dc.description.version | published | de |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018 | eng |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/49256 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
| dc.subject | Employer learning; Signaling games; Intuitive Criterion; Multiple pooling | eng |
| dc.subject.ddc | 330 | eng |
| dc.title | Job market signaling and employer learning | eng |
| dc.type | JOURNAL_ARTICLE | de |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| kops.citation.bibtex | @article{AlosFerrer2012-09marke-49256,
year={2012},
doi={10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018},
title={Job market signaling and employer learning},
number={5},
volume={147},
issn={0022-0531},
journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
pages={1787--1817},
author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Prat, Julien}
} | |
| kops.citation.iso690 | ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Julien PRAT, 2012. Job market signaling and employer learning. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Elsevier. 2012, 147(5), pp. 1787-1817. ISSN 0022-0531. eISSN 1095-7235. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018 | deu |
| kops.citation.iso690 | ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Julien PRAT, 2012. Job market signaling and employer learning. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Elsevier. 2012, 147(5), pp. 1787-1817. ISSN 0022-0531. eISSN 1095-7235. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018 | eng |
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