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Job market signaling and employer learning

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2012

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Journal of Economic Theory. Elsevier. 2012, 147(5), pp. 1787-1817. ISSN 0022-0531. eISSN 1095-7235. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018

Zusammenfassung

We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.

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Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

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Employer learning; Signaling games; Intuitive Criterion; Multiple pooling

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ISO 690ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Julien PRAT, 2012. Job market signaling and employer learning. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Elsevier. 2012, 147(5), pp. 1787-1817. ISSN 0022-0531. eISSN 1095-7235. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018
BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2012-09marke-49256,
  year={2012},
  doi={10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018},
  title={Job market signaling and employer learning},
  number={5},
  volume={147},
  issn={0022-0531},
  journal={Journal of Economic Theory},
  pages={1787--1817},
  author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Prat, Julien}
}
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