Job market signaling and employer learning
Job market signaling and employer learning
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Date
2012
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Prat, Julien
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Journal of Economic Theory ; 147 (2012), 5. - pp. 1787-1817. - Elsevier. - ISSN 0022-0531. - eISSN 1095-7235
Abstract
We consider a signaling model where the senderʼs continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.
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330 Economics
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Employer learning; Signaling games; Intuitive Criterion; Multiple pooling
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ALÓS-FERRER, Carlos, Julien PRAT, 2012. Job market signaling and employer learning. In: Journal of Economic Theory. Elsevier. 147(5), pp. 1787-1817. ISSN 0022-0531. eISSN 1095-7235. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018BibTex
@article{AlosFerrer2012-09marke-49256, year={2012}, doi={10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.018}, title={Job market signaling and employer learning}, number={5}, volume={147}, issn={0022-0531}, journal={Journal of Economic Theory}, pages={1787--1817}, author={Alós-Ferrer, Carlos and Prat, Julien} }
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