On the Nature of Fair Behavior

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2003
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Falk, Armin
Fehr, Ernst
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This article shows that identical offers in an ultimatum game generate systematically different rejection rates depending on the other offers that are available to the proposer. This result casts doubt on the consequentialist practice in economics to define the utility of an action solely in terms of the consequences of the action irrespective of the set of alternatives. It means in particular that negatively reciprocal behavior cannot be fully captured by equity models that are exclusively based on preferences over the distribution of material payoffs.

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ISO 690FALK, Armin, Ernst FEHR, Urs FISCHBACHER, 2003. On the Nature of Fair Behavior. In: Economic Inquiry. 2003, 41(1), pp. 20-26. ISSN 0095-2583. eISSN 1465-7295. Available under: doi: 10.1093/ei/41.1.20
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@article{Falk2003-01Natur-39982,
  year={2003},
  doi={10.1093/ei/41.1.20},
  title={On the Nature of Fair Behavior},
  number={1},
  volume={41},
  issn={0095-2583},
  journal={Economic Inquiry},
  pages={20--26},
  author={Falk, Armin and Fehr, Ernst and Fischbacher, Urs}
}
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