Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager

Hodder, Jim; Jackwerth, Jens

Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager

Dateien

Jackwerth_0-379050.pdfGröße: 19.78 KBDownloads: 57

Datum

2005

Autor:innen

Hodder, Jim

Jackwerth, Jens

URI (zitierfähiger Link)

http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-379050

Link zur Lizenz

Urheberrechtlich geschützt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

ZEWnews English Edition : Special Stock Option Watch. 2005(3), pp. 3-4

Zusammenfassung

The academic discussion of the value of employee stock options has focused for a long time on the reduced value of the employee stock option to the employee. This low value is typically attributed to market incompleteness, as the employee cannot hedge the option perfectly. However, in a recent working paper, Hodder and Jackwerth (2004) argue that employee stock options are much more valuable once we take into consideration that managers (and possibly some lower level employees, too) can actually influence the risk taking of the firm. What we find is that the manager will optimally take on risks in order to increase the value of his employee stock options.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

HODDER, Jim, Jens JACKWERTH, 2005. Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager. In: ZEWnews English Edition : Special Stock Option Watch. 2005(3), pp. 3-4

BibTex

@article{Hodder2005Emplo-36318,
  year={2005},
  title={Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager},
  url={http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/zn/en/zn032005.pdf},
  number={3},
  journal={ZEWnews English Edition : Special Stock Option Watch},
  pages={3--4},
  author={Hodder, Jim and Jackwerth, Jens}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/36318">
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-12-14T15:33:20Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/36318/3/Jackwerth_0-379050.pdf"/>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dc:contributor>Hodder, Jim</dc:contributor>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-12-14T15:33:20Z</dcterms:available>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:title>Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager</dcterms:title>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dcterms:issued>2005</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/36318/3/Jackwerth_0-379050.pdf"/>
    <dc:creator>Jackwerth, Jens</dc:creator>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/36318"/>
    <dc:creator>Hodder, Jim</dc:creator>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The academic discussion of the value of employee stock options has focused for a long time on the reduced value of the employee stock option to the employee. This low value is typically attributed to market incompleteness, as the employee cannot hedge the option perfectly. However, in a recent working paper, Hodder and Jackwerth (2004) argue that employee stock options are much more valuable once we take into consideration that managers (and possibly some lower level employees, too) can actually influence the risk taking of the firm. What we find is that the manager will optimally take on risks in order to increase the value of his employee stock options.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Jackwerth, Jens</dc:contributor>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

URL der Originalveröffentl.

http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/zn/en/zn032005.pdf

Prüfdatum der URL

2016-12-14

Universitätsbibliographie

Ja