Publikation: Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager
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2005
Autor:innen
Hodder, Jim
Herausgeber:innen
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Erschienen in
ZEWnews English Edition : Special Stock Option Watch. 2005(3), pp. 3-4
Zusammenfassung
The academic discussion of the value of employee stock options has focused for a long time on the reduced value of the employee stock option to the employee. This low value is typically attributed to market incompleteness, as the employee cannot hedge the option perfectly. However, in a recent working paper, Hodder and Jackwerth (2004) argue that employee stock options are much more valuable once we take into consideration that managers (and possibly some lower level employees, too) can actually influence the risk taking of the firm. What we find is that the manager will optimally take on risks in order to increase the value of his employee stock options.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
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HODDER, Jim, Jens JACKWERTH, 2005. Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager. In: ZEWnews English Edition : Special Stock Option Watch. 2005(3), pp. 3-4BibTex
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year={2005},
title={Why Employee Stock Options Could Be Worth Much More To The Manager},
url={http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/zn/en/zn032005.pdf},
number={3},
journal={ZEWnews English Edition : Special Stock Option Watch},
pages={3--4},
author={Hodder, Jim and Jackwerth, Jens}
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<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">The academic discussion of the value of employee stock options has focused for a long time on the reduced value of the employee stock option to the employee. This low value is typically attributed to market incompleteness, as the employee cannot hedge the option perfectly. However, in a recent working paper, Hodder and Jackwerth (2004) argue that employee stock options are much more valuable once we take into consideration that managers (and possibly some lower level employees, too) can actually influence the risk taking of the firm. What we find is that the manager will optimally take on risks in order to increase the value of his employee stock options.</dcterms:abstract>
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URL der Originalveröffentl.
Prüfdatum der URL
2016-12-14
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Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
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Ja
