Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation

Holzinger, Katharina

Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation

Dateien

Holzinger_Tax.pdf(12.81 MB)

Datum

2005

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Erschienen in

Rationality and Society ; 17 (2005), 4. - S. 475-510. - ISSN 1043-4631

Zusammenfassung

It took the European Union (EU) 35 years to achieve a co-operative agreement on co-ordinated measures of savings taxation. Political science has offered two explanations for this. First, co-operation is difficult to achieve as a result of heterogeneity. Countries with a small domestic tax base favor tax competition, while countries with a large tax base prefer tax co-operation. Second, co-operation is difficult as a consequence of specific characteristics of the collective action problem involved. The actors face a prisoners’ dilemma. Both explanations have their limits. The first approach is not very good at predicting actual policy preferences of governments and the second approach dismisses the fact that the EU offers cooperative institutions that should be able to resolve a dilemma. The paper refines these explanations such that the theory fits better the empirical positions of EU governments and their problems of finding an agreement.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

320 Politik

Schlagwörter

EU policy,financial markets,savings taxation,tax competition,tax co-operation

Zitieren

ISO 690

HOLZINGER, Katharina, 2005. Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation. In: Rationality and Society. 17(4), pp. 475-510. ISSN 1043-4631. Available under: doi: 10.1177/1043463105058319

BibTex

@article{Holzinger2005Compe-14153,
  year={2005},
  doi={10.1177/1043463105058319},
  title={Tax Competition and Tax Co-operation in the EU : The Case of Savings Taxation},
  number={4},
  volume={17},
  issn={1043-4631},
  journal={Rationality and Society},
  pages={475--510},
  author={Holzinger, Katharina}
}

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