Competition within firms

dc.contributor.authorBruttel, Lisa
dc.contributor.authorSchudy, Simeon
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:43:11Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:43:11Zdeu
dc.date.issued2010deu
dc.description.abstractWe investigate the role of incentives set by a parent firm for competition among its subsidiaries. In a Cournot experiment four subsidiaries of the same parent operate in the same market. Parents earn a specific share of the joint profit and can choose how to distribute the remaining surplus (or loss). Results show that parents allocating profits equally among their subsidiaries reach outcomes close to collusion. However, almost half of the parent firms employ a proportional sharing rule instead. These groups end up with profits around the Cournot level.eng
dc.description.versionpublished
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dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2010deu
dc.relation.ispartofseriesResearch paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut
dc.rightsterms-of-usedeu
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/deu
dc.subjectCournot Competitiondeu
dc.subjectSubsidiarydeu
dc.subjectSubcompanydeu
dc.subjectExperimentdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.titleCompetition within firmseng
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  author={Bruttel, Lisa and Schudy, Simeon}
}
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