Publikation:

What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

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2017

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http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-3dkgs9vf1ylt5
DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015
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Wirtschaftswissenschaften: Publikationen
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Published

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Economics Letters. 2017, 150, pp. 83-85. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015

Zusammenfassung

Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one- shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to- omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Public good, Social dilemma, Nash-equilibrium, Conditional cooperation, Social preferences

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ISO 690WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2017. What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?. In: Economics Letters. 2017, 150, pp. 83-85. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015
BibTex
@article{Wolff2017equil-46604,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015},
  title={What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?},
  volume={150},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={83--85},
  author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}
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