What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

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2017
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Zusammenfassung

Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one- shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to- omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.

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330 Wirtschaft
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Public good, Social dilemma, Nash-equilibrium, Conditional cooperation, Social preferences
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ISO 690WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2017. What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?. In: Economics Letters. 2017, 150, pp. 83-85. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015
BibTex
@article{Wolff2017equil-46604,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015},
  title={What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?},
  volume={150},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={83--85},
  author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}
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