What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

Wolff, Irenaeus

What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?

Files

Wolff_2-3dkgs9vf1ylt5.pdf(59.76 KB)

Date

2017

Publication type

Journal article

Publication status

Published

Published in

Economics Letters ; 150 (2017). - pp. 83-85. - ISSN 0165-1765. - eISSN 1873-7374

Abstract

Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one- shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-to- omnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

Public good, Social dilemma, Nash-equilibrium, Conditional cooperation, Social preferences

Cite This

ISO 690

WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2017. What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?. In: Economics Letters. 150, pp. 83-85. ISSN 0165-1765. eISSN 1873-7374. Available under: doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015

BibTex

@article{Wolff2017equil-46604,
  year={2017},
  doi={10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.015},
  title={What are the equilibria in public-good experiments?},
  volume={150},
  issn={0165-1765},
  journal={Economics Letters},
  pages={83--85},
  author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}

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Refereed

Yes