The Watchdog or the Mandarin? : Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process

No Thumbnail Available
Files
There are no files associated with this item.
Date
2019
Editors
Contact
Journal ISSN
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliographical data
Publisher
Series
URI (citable link)
ArXiv-ID
International patent number
Link to the license
oops
EU project number
Project
Open Access publication
Restricted until
Title in another language
Research Projects
Organizational Units
Journal Issue
Publication type
Journal article
Publication status
Published
Published in
Journal of European Public Policy ; 26 (2019), 3. - pp. 407-427. - ISSN 1350-1763. - eISSN 1466-4429
Abstract
This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: ‘the Watchdog’ and ‘the Mandarin’ of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. However, if the lead DG acts as the Mandarin, proximity of its preference to the EU principals should result in more executive leeway as its policy preference is more beneficial for the EU legislators. To tests the conjunctions, this study focuses on two dimensions of EU political space: Left-Right (LR) and Pro/Anti-EU. The results suggest that the legislators will indulge the Commission with more leeway for the implementation when their preferences are more congruent with the position of the lead DG on the LR dimension, thus supporting ‘the Mandarin’ perspective.
Summary in another language
Subject (DDC)
320 Politics
Keywords
Directorates general, discretionary limits, EU commission, legislative politics, principal–agent
Conference
Review
undefined / . - undefined, undefined. - (undefined; undefined)
Cite This
ISO 690ERSHOVA, Anastasia, 2019. The Watchdog or the Mandarin? : Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process. In: Journal of European Public Policy. 26(3), pp. 407-427. ISSN 1350-1763. eISSN 1466-4429. Available under: doi: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1447009
BibTex
@article{Ershova2019-03-04Watch-45478,
  year={2019},
  doi={10.1080/13501763.2018.1447009},
  title={The Watchdog or the Mandarin? : Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process},
  number={3},
  volume={26},
  issn={1350-1763},
  journal={Journal of European Public Policy},
  pages={407--427},
  author={Ershova, Anastasia}
}
RDF
<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/45478">
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2019-03-14T15:41:27Z</dc:date>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: ‘the Watchdog’ and ‘the Mandarin’ of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. However, if the lead DG acts as the Mandarin, proximity of its preference to the EU principals should result in more executive leeway as its policy preference is more beneficial for the EU legislators. To tests the conjunctions, this study focuses on two dimensions of EU political space: Left-Right (LR) and Pro/Anti-EU. The results suggest that the legislators will indulge the Commission with more leeway for the implementation when their preferences are more congruent with the position of the lead DG on the LR dimension, thus supporting ‘the Mandarin’ perspective.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dc:contributor>Ershova, Anastasia</dc:contributor>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/42"/>
    <dc:creator>Ershova, Anastasia</dc:creator>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2019-03-14T15:41:27Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:title>The Watchdog or the Mandarin? : Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process</dcterms:title>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/45478"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2019-03-04</dcterms:issued>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
Internal note
xmlui.Submission.submit.DescribeStep.inputForms.label.kops_note_fromSubmitter
Contact
URL of original publication
Test date of URL
Examination date of dissertation
Method of financing
Comment on publication
Alliance license
Corresponding Authors der Uni Konstanz vorhanden
International Co-Authors
Bibliography of Konstanz
Yes
Refereed
Yes