Publikation:

Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

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Fischbacher_0-389124.pdf
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Datum

2011

Autor:innen

Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska
Teyssier, Sabrina

Herausgeber:innen

Kontakt

ISSN der Zeitschrift

Electronic ISSN

ISBN

Bibliografische Daten

Verlag

Schriftenreihe

ALISS; 2011-03

Auflagebezeichnung

DOI (zitierfähiger Link)
ArXiv-ID

Internationale Patentnummer

Angaben zur Forschungsförderung

Projekt

Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz

Gesperrt bis

Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published

Erschienen in

Zusammenfassung

Contributions to public goods are often unobservable. In order to make contributions visible, voluntary standards are used, which make a particular contribution level publicly observable. This paper investigates the effect of such partial information on the contributions to public goods. First, we observe that the implementation of a too low standard level leads to the lowest efficiency. Second, we find that standards function as a coordination device. Higher standards give rise to higher modal contribution but the likelihood that the standard level is reached gets lower. Third, conditional cooperation is observed in the sense that subjects are more likely to comply with the standard as the number of group members who previously complied with it is higher.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Public goods, Information, Standards, Coordination

Konferenz

Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined

Forschungsvorhaben

Organisationseinheiten

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Zugehörige Datensätze in KOPS

Zitieren

ISO 690FISCHBACHER, Urs, Franziska FÖLLMI-HEUSI, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2011. Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games
BibTex
@techreport{Fischbacher2011Volun-38203,
  year={2011},
  series={ALISS},
  title={Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games},
  number={2011-03},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska and Teyssier, Sabrina}
}
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