Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

Fischbacher, Urs; Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska; Teyssier, Sabrina

Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

Files

Fischbacher_0-389124.pdf(356.34 KB)

Date

2011

Authors

Fischbacher, Urs

Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska

Teyssier, Sabrina

Series

ALISS; 2011-03

Publication type

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publication status

Published

Abstract

Contributions to public goods are often unobservable. In order to make contributions visible, voluntary standards are used, which make a particular contribution level publicly observable. This paper investigates the effect of such partial information on the contributions to public goods. First, we observe that the implementation of a too low standard level leads to the lowest efficiency. Second, we find that standards function as a coordination device. Higher standards give rise to higher modal contribution but the likelihood that the standard level is reached gets lower. Third, conditional cooperation is observed in the sense that subjects are more likely to comply with the standard as the number of group members who previously complied with it is higher.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

Public goods, Information, Standards, Coordination

Cite This

ISO 690

FISCHBACHER, Urs, Franziska FÖLLMI-HEUSI, Sabrina TEYSSIER, 2011. Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games

BibTex

@techreport{Fischbacher2011Volun-38203,
  year={2011},
  series={ALISS},
  title={Voluntary Standards and Coordination in Public Goods Games},
  number={2011-03},
  author={Fischbacher, Urs and Föllmi-Heusi, Franziska and Teyssier, Sabrina}
}

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Bibliography of Konstanz

Yes