What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?
Lade...
Dateien
Datum
2016
Autor:innen
Herausgeber:innen
ISSN der Zeitschrift
Electronic ISSN
ISBN
Bibliografische Daten
Verlag
Schriftenreihe
Auflagebezeichnung
URI (zitierfähiger Link)
Internationale Patentnummer
Link zur Lizenz
Angaben zur Forschungsförderung
Projekt
Open Access-Veröffentlichung
Open Access Green
Sammlungen
Core Facility der Universität Konstanz
Titel in einer weiteren Sprache
Publikationstyp
Working Paper/Technical Report
Publikationsstatus
Published
Erschienen in
Zusammenfassung
Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-toomnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft
Schlagwörter
Konferenz
Rezension
undefined / . - undefined, undefined
Zitieren
ISO 690
WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2016. What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?BibTex
@techreport{Wolff2016equil-34638,
year={2016},
series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
title={What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?},
number={105},
author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}RDF
<rdf:RDF
xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/34638">
<foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
<dc:language>eng</dc:language>
<dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/34638"/>
<dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/34638/3/Wolff_0-344779.pdf"/>
<dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
<void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
<dcterms:title>What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?</dcterms:title>
<dc:contributor>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:contributor>
<dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
<dc:creator>Wolff, Irenaeus</dc:creator>
<dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
<dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-toomnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.</dcterms:abstract>
<dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/34638/3/Wolff_0-344779.pdf"/>
<dcterms:issued>2016</dcterms:issued>
<dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-07-01T09:38:14Z</dc:date>
<dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-07-01T09:38:14Z</dcterms:available>
</rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>
