What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

Wolff, Irenaeus

What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

Dateien

Wolff_0-344779.pdf(669.67 KB)

Datum

2016

Autor:innen

Wolff, Irenaeus

Schriftenreihe

Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut; 105

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-toomnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2016. What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

BibTex

@techreport{Wolff2016equil-34638,
  year={2016},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?},
  number={105},
  author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}

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