What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?

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2016
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Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut; 105
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Most social-preference models have been tailored to yield only a full-defection equilibrium in one-shot linear public-good situations. This paper determines the Nash-equilibrium sets that result from experiment participants’ elicited preferences. The data show that multiple equilibria are relatively frequent even in a standard three-player setting. In this perspective, the common finding of close-toomnilateral defection at the end of repeated public-good games is surprising and raises the question of why the dynamics of play seem to select this equilibrium out of the existing equilibria.
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ISO 690WOLFF, Irenaeus, 2016. What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?
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@techreport{Wolff2016equil-34638,
  year={2016},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={What are the equilibria in linear public-good experiments?},
  number={105},
  author={Wolff, Irenaeus}
}
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