Biased Coercion : The Imposition, Management, and Termination of US Sanctions

Abstract

Sanctions have evolved into a popular foreign policy tool. Especially, the United States has heavily relied on such coercive measures to address international challenges of peace and security. To date, it has imposed sanctions more frequently than any other country or international institution. Yet, its sanctions decisions show two inconsistencies: While the US is quick to sanction some foreign countries for their transgressions, it is hesitant to punish others. Similarly, some countries remain under US sanctions for decades, while for others punishment is only brief. This raises the following questions: Are US sanctions decisions biased? And, if so, what are the sources of that bias? This dissertation is dedicated to answering this research puzzle. It introduces a comprehensive framework for studying possible domestic and international sources of bias in sanctions decision-making (Chapter 2). It then applies this framework to the empirical study of the three different stages of the sanctions process using the US as its case, starting with the imposition (Chapter 3), over the management (Chapter 4), through the termination of these coercive measures (Chapter 5). For each stage, it focuses on the level of analysis—domestic or international—that is currently underrepresented in the literature. Specifically, Chapter 3 presents evidence that sanctions can be imposed by leaders as part of a diversionary strategy to generate domestic gains. It makes the case that legislative constraints on presidential responses to domestic economic problems push presidents to the sanctions domain to demonstrate competence, leadership skills, and to secure public approval. Using a novel dataset on US sanctions from 1989 to 2015, it shows that US presidents are more likely to use sanctions when unemployment levels are high and the president’s party power in Congress is weak. More importantly, it sheds light on leaders’ decision-making: it seems that when reverting to sanctions for domestic gains, presidents opt for measures that inflict little to no harm on the US economy itself. The second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) moves to the next stage of the process, the management of sanctions, and shifts attention to international sources of bias. Together with Julia Grauvogel, I focus on a subset of cases—the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) sanctions regime—that are enshrined in legislation by Congress yet enforced and monitored by the executive. Hereby we study US executive decisions related to the monitoring and enforcement of these coercive measures. We use original data on all TIP-related executive decisions from 2003 to 2008 and show that trade partners and key political allies are both subjected to softer assessments and are more likely to have the imposed sanctions waived. The results indicate that the process is driven by the executive’s attempts to minimize the economic and political costs of sanctions for the US itself. Finally, in Chapter 5, I turn to the last stage of the sanctions process: the termination of these coercive measures. I draw on work emphasizing the audience and reputational costs related to sanctions termination and posit that domestic constraints affect leaders’ decision-making on the lifting of these measures. Using novel data on all US sanctions imposed between 1990 and 2018, I provide evidence that, first, presidents with stronger party power in Congress are more likely to end sanctions. The effect is more pronounced for termination decisions despite the target’s resistance to US demands. Second, higher approval ratings similarly increase the likelihood of sanctions termination by US capitulation. Lastly, sanctions that include mechanisms of congressional oversight not only last longer but are less likely to be lifted by the president prior to goal attainment. The results indicate that leaders rely on their political capital vis-à-vis the public and Congress to take potentially costly termination decisions, especially when they anticipate pushback from the latter. Taken altogether, this dissertation presents a nuanced framework for studying sanctions and improves our understanding of why and how these measures are used by state leaders. It also sheds light on the latter stages of the sanctions process—their management and termination—that have hitherto attracted insufficient scholarly attention as compared to for the imposition and effectiveness of these measures. More precisely, this dissertation makes theoretical, conceptual, and empirical contributions to the scholarship. Theoretically, it introduces a comprehensive framework that accounts for both domestic and international sources of bias at the different stages of the sanctions process. Conceptually, it accounts for the varying dynamics and interests among domestic actors in the sender country that affect the sanctions process. Empirically, it uses novel data, employs statistical tests, and utilizes interview material to provide evidence that sanctions are biased from cradle to grave. The findings help change the way we think about sanctions in two key ways. First, they underline that to fully understand the use and effectiveness of these measures, one should look at the entire sanctions process and account for domestic and international circumstances. Second, they remind us of the diversity of sanctions—as an instrument that has both symbolic and punitive attributes and is not tied to specific policy goals. This explains why leaders continue to use these measures despite their mixed record of success. Chapter 6 concludes by discussing the implications of this dissertation for sanctions in the twenty-first century: Evidence of bias can undermine the effectiveness hereof, as it negatively impacts both the credibility of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy and of the US in international bargaining. Finally, the results carry important policy implications on sanctions exit strategies.