Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information

Friehe, Tim

Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information

Dateien

Zu diesem Dokument gibt es keine Dateien.

Datum

2009

Publikationstyp

Zeitschriftenartikel

Publikationsstatus

Published

Erschienen in

Journal of Economics. 2009, 97(2), pp. 165-183. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y

Zusammenfassung

The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

Optimal law enforcement, Escalating sanctions, Repeat offender, Imperfect information

Zitieren

ISO 690

FRIEHE, Tim, 2009. Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information. In: Journal of Economics. 2009, 97(2), pp. 165-183. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y

BibTex

@article{Friehe2009Escal-1837,
  year={2009},
  doi={10.1007/s00712-009-0058-y},
  title={Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders : a Note on the Role of Information},
  number={2},
  volume={97},
  journal={Journal of Economics},
  pages={165--183},
  author={Friehe, Tim}
}

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Universitätsbibliographie

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