The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance

Kurzanzeige
dc.contributor.authorBruttel, Lisa
dc.contributor.authorFriehe, Tim
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-25T09:42:39Zdeu
dc.date.available2011-03-25T09:42:39Zdeu
dc.date.issued2010deu
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents experimental evidence on the way in which the design of law enforcement impacts legal compliance. The experiment includes two law enforcement designs: one in which sanctioning results in victim-compensation and one in which sanctions are rent-seeking devices for the enforcer. We show that in the rent-seeking design (i) potential violators choose non-compliance more often and (ii) the average violator tries to avoid detection less aggressively.eng
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dc.language.isoengdeu
dc.legacy.dateIssued2010deu
dc.relation.ispartofseriesResearch paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0 Generic
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/
dc.subjectnorm compliancedeu
dc.subjectexperimentdeu
dc.subjectavoidancedeu
dc.subjectlaw enforcementdeu
dc.subject.ddc330deu
dc.subject.jelC91deu
dc.subject.jelK42deu
dc.titleThe Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Complianceeng
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  author={Bruttel, Lisa and Friehe, Tim}
}
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