The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance

Bruttel, Lisa; Friehe, Tim

The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance

Files

TWI_RPS_050_Bruttel_Friehe_2010_05_01.pdf(289.44 KB)

Date

2010

Authors

Bruttel, Lisa

Friehe, Tim

Series

Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut; 50

Publication type

Working Paper/Technical Report

Abstract

This paper presents experimental evidence on the way in which the design of law enforcement impacts legal compliance. The experiment includes two law enforcement designs: one in which sanctioning results in victim-compensation and one in which sanctions are rent-seeking devices for the enforcer. We show that in the rent-seeking design (i) potential violators choose non-compliance more often and (ii) the average violator tries to avoid detection less aggressively.

Subject (DDC)

330 Economics

Keywords

norm compliance,experiment,avoidance,law enforcement

Cite This

ISO 690

BRUTTEL, Lisa, Tim FRIEHE, 2010. The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance

BibTex

@techreport{Bruttel2010Impac-12097,
  year={2010},
  series={Research paper series / Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut},
  title={The Impact of Law Enforcement Design on Legal Compliance},
  number={50},
  author={Bruttel, Lisa and Friehe, Tim}
}

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Bibliography of Konstanz

Yes