Publikation: Intrinsicality and counterpart theory
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2016
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Synthese. 2016, 193(8), pp. 2353-2365. ISSN 0039-7857. eISSN 1573-0964. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0847-5
Zusammenfassung
It is shown that counterpart theory and the duplication account of intrinsicality—two key pieces of the Lewisian package—are incompatible. In particular, the duplication account yields the result that certain intuitively extrinsic modal properties are intrinsic. Along the way I consider a potentially more general worry concerning certain existential closures of internal relations. One conclusion is that, unless the Lewisian provides an adequate alternative to the duplication account, the reductive nature of their total theory is in jeopardy.
Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache
Fachgebiet (DDC)
100 Philosophie
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Intrinsicality, Counterpart theory, Modality, Duplicate
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DE, Michael, 2016. Intrinsicality and counterpart theory. In: Synthese. 2016, 193(8), pp. 2353-2365. ISSN 0039-7857. eISSN 1573-0964. Available under: doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0847-5BibTex
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year={2016},
doi={10.1007/s11229-015-0847-5},
title={Intrinsicality and counterpart theory},
number={8},
volume={193},
issn={0039-7857},
journal={Synthese},
pages={2353--2365},
author={De, Michael}
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