The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover

Scholl, Almuth

The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover

Dateien

Scholl_0-318852.pdfGröße: 625.61 KBDownloads: 377

Datum

2015

Open Access-Veröffentlichung

Open Access Green

Sammlungen

Wirtschaftswissenschaften

Publikationstyp

Working Paper/Technical Report

Publikationsstatus

Published

Zusammenfassung

This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the interaction of sovereign default risk and political turnover. Two parties differ in their preferred size of public spending which is financed by taxes and external debt. Electoral outcomes are characterized by tradeoffs between the economic benefits from the incumbent's policies against idiosyncratic ideological aspects. Quantitative simulations replicate the typical empirical facts of emerging markets. Endogenous political turnovers increase the parties' discrepancies between debt and default policies. Debt crises are associated with adverse economic shocks and trigger political turnovers. Political turnovers generate defaults even without negative shocks.

Fachgebiet (DDC)

330 Wirtschaft

Zitieren

ISO 690

SCHOLL, Almuth, 2015. The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover

BibTex

@techreport{Scholl2015Dynam-32695,
  year={2015},
  series={Working Paper Series / Department of Economics},
  title={The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover},
  number={2015-05},
  author={Scholl, Almuth}
}

RDF

<rdf:RDF
    xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
    xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
    xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#"
    xmlns:bibo="http://purl.org/ontology/bibo/"
    xmlns:dspace="http://digital-repositories.org/ontologies/dspace/0.1.0#"
    xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
    xmlns:void="http://rdfs.org/ns/void#"
    xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" > 
  <rdf:Description rdf:about="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/32695">
    <dcterms:title>The Dynamics of Sovereign Default Risk and Political Turnover</dcterms:title>
    <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
    <dcterms:hasPart rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/32695/1/Scholl_0-318852.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:issued>2015</dcterms:issued>
    <dcterms:abstract xml:lang="eng">This paper develops a stochastic dynamic politico-economic model of sovereign debt to analyze the interaction of sovereign default risk and political turnover. Two parties differ in their preferred size of public spending which is financed by taxes and external debt. Electoral outcomes are characterized by tradeoffs between the economic benefits from the incumbent's policies against idiosyncratic ideological aspects. Quantitative simulations replicate the typical empirical facts of emerging markets. Endogenous political turnovers increase the parties' discrepancies between debt and default policies. Debt crises are associated with adverse economic shocks and trigger political turnovers. Political turnovers generate defaults even without negative shocks.</dcterms:abstract>
    <dspace:hasBitstream rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/bitstream/123456789/32695/1/Scholl_0-318852.pdf"/>
    <dcterms:rights rdf:resource="https://rightsstatements.org/page/InC/1.0/"/>
    <dspace:isPartOfCollection rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <void:sparqlEndpoint rdf:resource="http://localhost/fuseki/dspace/sparql"/>
    <foaf:homepage rdf:resource="http://localhost:8080/"/>
    <dcterms:available rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-01-25T13:38:32Z</dcterms:available>
    <dcterms:isPartOf rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/server/rdf/resource/123456789/46"/>
    <dc:date rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#dateTime">2016-01-25T13:38:32Z</dc:date>
    <dc:contributor>Scholl, Almuth</dc:contributor>
    <bibo:uri rdf:resource="https://kops.uni-konstanz.de/handle/123456789/32695"/>
    <dc:rights>terms-of-use</dc:rights>
    <dc:creator>Scholl, Almuth</dc:creator>
  </rdf:Description>
</rdf:RDF>

Universitätsbibliographie

Ja