Goldlücke, Susanne

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## Suchergebnisse Publikationen

#### Reconciling Relational Contracting and Hold-up : A Model of Repeated Negotiations

2022, Goldlücke, Susanne, Kranz, Sebastian

Game-theoretic analysis of relational contracts typically studies Pareto optimal equilibria. We illustrate how this equilibrium selection rules out very intuitive hold-up concerns in stochastic games with long-term decisions. The key problem is that Pareto optimal equilibria, even if satisfying renegotiation-proofness, do not reflect plausible concerns about how today’s actions affect future bargaining positions within the relationship. We propose and characterize an alternative equilibrium selection based on the notion that continuation play is repeatedly negotiated in a relationship. We illustrate with several examples how the concept naturally combines relational contracting and hold-up concerns.

#### Discounted stochastic games with voluntary transfers

2018-07, Goldlücke, Susanne, Kranz, Sebastian

This paper studies discounted stochastic games with perfect or imperfect public monitoring and the opportunity to conduct voluntary monetary transfers and possibly burn money. This generalization of repeated games with transfers is ideally suited to study relational contracting in applications with long-term investments and also allows to study collusive industry dynamics. We show that for all discount factors every perfect public equilibrium payoff can be implemented with a class of simple equilibria that have a stationary structure on the equilibrium path and optimal penal codes with a stick-and-carrot structure. We develop an algorithm for perfect monitoring to compute the set of equilibrium payoffs and find simple equilibria that implement these payoffs.

#### Investments as Signals of Outside Options

2014, Goldlücke, Susanne, Schmitz, Patrick W.

Consider a seller who can make an observable but non-contractible investment to improve an intermediate good that is specialized to a particular buyerʼs needs. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. The seller has private information about the fraction of the ex post surplus that he can realize on his own. Compared to a situation with complete information, additional investment incentives are generated by the sellerʼs desire to pretend a strong outside option. On the other hand, ex post efficiency is not attained since asymmetric information at the bargaining stage sometimes leads to inefficient separations.

#### Repeated Moral Hazard And Contracts With Memory : The Case of Risk Neutrality

2012, Goldlücke, Susanne, Schmitz, Patrick W.

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first-period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be "too good" to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be "overqualified".

#### Strategic gaze : an interactive eye-tracking study

2021-03, Hausfeld, Jan, von Hesler, Konstantin, Goldlücke, Susanne

We present an interactive eye-tracking study that explores the strategic use of gaze. We analyze gaze behavior in an experiment with four simple games. The game can either be a competitive (hide & seek) game in which players want to be unpredictable, or a game of common interest in which players want to be predictable. Gaze is transmitted either in real time to another subject, or it is not transmitted and therefore non-strategic. We find that subjects are able to interpret non-strategic gaze, obtaining substantially higher payoffs than subjects who do not see gaze. If gaze is transmitted in real time, gaze becomes more informative in the common interest games and players predominantly succeed to coordinate on efficient outcomes. In contrast, gaze becomes less informative in the competitive game.

#### Why agents need discretion : the business judgement rule as optimal standard of care

2017, Engert, Andreas, Goldlücke, Susanne

Should managers be liable for ill-conceived business decisions? One answer is given by U.S. courts, which almost never hold managers liable for their mistakes. In this paper, we address the question in a theoretical model of delegated decision making. We find that courts should indeed be lenient as long as contracts are restricted to be linear. With more general compensation schemes, the answer depends on the precision of the court’s signal. If courts make many mistakes in evaluating decisions, they should not impose liability for poor business judgment.

#### Renegotiation-proof relational contracts

2013, Goldlücke, Susanne, Kranz, Sebastian

We study infinitely repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and assume that each period consists of two stages: one in which the players simultaneously choose an action and one in which they can transfer money to each other. In the first part of the paper, we derive simple conditions that allow a constructive characterization of all Pareto-optimal subgame perfect payoffs for all discount factors. In the second part, we examine different concepts of renegotiation-proofness and extend the characterization to renegotiation-proof payoffs.

#### Pollution claim settlements reconsidered : Hidden information and bounded payments

2018-11, Goldlücke, Susanne, Schmitz, Patrick W.

A principal’s production decision imposes a negative externality on an agent. The principal may be a pollution-generating firm, the agent may be a nearby town. The principal offers a contract to the agent, who has the right to be free of pollution. Then the agent privately learns the disutility of pollution. Finally, a production level and a transfer payment are implemented. Suppose there is an upper bound (possibly zero) on payments that the agent can make to the principal. In the second-best solution, there is underproduction for low cost types, while there is overproduction for high cost types. In contrast to standard adverse selection models of pollution claim settlements, there may thus be too much pollution compared to the first-best solution.

#### Strategic recruiting in ongoing hierarchies

2017, Goldlücke, Susanne

This paper describes a hierarchy with peer hiring to explore the reasons behind the management rule “A’s hire A’s and B’s hire C’s”. Workers are promoted based on talent and therefore like to hire less talented co-workers. This is why B’s hire C’s. The same logic should cause A’s to hire B’s, but there is a trade-off in the model: A’s are more likely to be promoted, and a manager profits from more talented subordinates. If this effect is strong enough, then indeed A’s hire A’s

#### Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers

2012, Goldlücke, Susanne, Kranz, Sebastian

This paper studies infinitely repeated games with imperfect public monitoring and the possibility of monetary transfers. It is shown that all public perfect equilibrium payoffs can be implemented with a simple class of stationary equilibria that use stick-and-carrot punishments. A fast algorithm is developed that exactly computes the set of pure strategies equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors.