Datensatz:

Data and Code for: Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions

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Datum der Erstveröffentlichung

2024

Autor:innen

Andere Beitragende

Repositorium der Erstveröffentlichung

ICPSR

Version des Datensatzes

V1
DOI (Link zu den Daten)
https://doi.org/10.3886/e192661v1
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Titel in einer weiteren Sprache

Publikationsstatus
Published

Zusammenfassung

Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, this is sufficient to reach a high and stable cooperation rate. However, repeated communication is important to maintain a high level of cooperation under imperfect monitoring, where players face additional uncertainty about the history of play.

Zusammenfassung in einer weiteren Sprache

Fachgebiet (DDC)
330 Wirtschaft

Schlagwörter

infinitely repeated games, monitoring, communication, cooperation, strategic uncertainty, prisoner's dilemma

Zugehörige Publikationen in KOPS

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Publikation
Zeitschriftenartikel
Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
(2024) Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian
Erschienen in: American Economic Journal : Microeconomics. American Economic Association (AEA). 2024, 16(3), S. 232-258. ISSN 1945-7669. eISSN 1945-7685. Verfügbar unter: doi: 10.1257/mic.20210117
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ISO 690DVORAK, Fabian, Sebastian FEHRLER, 2024. Data and Code for: Negotiating Cooperation under Uncertainty : Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
BibTex
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